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TOP LEvEL ACTORS SPEAK ABOUT SOCIAL POLICY 
AND INTERGENERATIONAL INHERITANCE 
OF INEQUALITIES 
SOCIAL POLICY WITHIN EUROPE AS A SUBJECT  
OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 
The European Union (EU) is often considered as a predominantly economic 
construction; however, there are shared values and priorities that set this political 
body apart from any other political counterpart of the world. These features are 
headlined as the ‘European Social Model’ (ESM) [Begg, Berghmann 2002].
The ESM and particular welfare states have been subjected to numerous 
analyses from all ranges of social sciences, as well as studied via interdiscipli-
nary research projects. The inquiry into the condition and perspectives of social 
policy in European states was in past years structured around several particular 
topics mentioned below. 
WELFARE STATE: PREDICTED BANKRuPTCY,  
ACHIEVED STATuS quO, EXPECTED CHANGES 
First, the idea of welfare state has been exposed to the analysis of some 
scholars who since the 1970s were trying to prove that the idea of generous wel-
fare state is in crisis and could potentially bankrupt. As Kuhnle [2001: 103–105] 
states: From the 1970s, various theorists have claimed a iscal crisis (o’Connor 
1973); a crisis of governmental overload (e.g. rose and Peters 1978); a crisis of 
legitimacy (e.g. Habermas 1976); a crisis of liberal democracy (e.g. Crozier et 
al. 1975). if by crisis is meant breakdown or radical institutional change, none 
of the theories can be said to have <succeeded> empirically, so far. 
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Kuhnle follows with assumption that accordingly to many empirical inves-
tigations the European welfare states were growing during 1980s and 1990s in 
terms of number of employees, as well as the scale of public expenditures and 
number of beneiciaries. another distinguished welfare state analyst proving in 
scientiic manner invalidity of crisis predictions, described them as myths, based 
on sometimes real and serious presumptions, but used frequently by ideologically 
motivated critics of socially responsible welfare state [Castles 2004: 45-46]. 
Indeed, even in the United Kingdom and the United States of America, where 
traditional welfare state was exposed to biggest ideological attack in course of 
1980s, no fundamental changes in measurable outcomes could be noticed1. 
The analysts of welfare state in many cases try to disregard political swings 
in states under study and concentrate just on the institutional and economic di-
mensions of the welfare state, paying special attention to the size and structure of 
social transfers or the scale of public social provision. However, some scholars 
like for instance Walter Korpi claim that factors other than expenditure data and 
its relation to the Gross Domestic Product should also be taken into account. In 
his opinion special attention should be paid to: descriptions and  quantifying of 
the legislated social rights in major social insurance programmes and analysis 
of the situation in the labour market and pay-as-you-go pension schemes [2003: 
591-598]. In Korpi’s work, also a nature of the partisan politics in given country 
is taken into account as impacting the welfare state, as well as increasing gender 
inequality in some Western countries as the result of reliance on means-tested 
beneits. Pointing out also at some global economic and demographic trends 
which appeared in Western post-industrial societies, Korpi agrees that the scale 
of the welfare state retrenchment in Europe so far does not support hypothesis of 
the twilight of European welfare model. Still some further changes in its nature 
seem unavoidable. 
1 Someone not familiar with the speciic discourse of social policy analysis and methodology 
of welfare state measurement may say that the statement of exaggerated impact of Thatcher’s 
policy on contemporary Britain has nothing to do with social reality. It is known from numerous 
sociological studies that reforms of national economy imposed by Margaret Thatcher contributed 
to serious transformation of social structure and situation of signiicant part of British society. 
However, what Kuhnle and Pierson as social policy analysts have in mind, is the scale of various 
national social expenditures, as well as the structure of public expenditure as the most important 
indicators of the welfare state development. 
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SOCIAL POLICY WITHIN THE EuROPEAN uNION: DECADE  
OF CHANGES AND EXPECTATIONS TOWARDS FuTuRE 
The same challenges faced by European countries used to provoke various 
solutions in the past, but in the era of Europeanization and harmonization of the 
policies, some common solutions are urgently needed. Here we get to another 
crucial point on the agenda of social policy analysts nowadays. The impact of the 
European Union (or by then the European Economic Community) on national 
welfare policies has been traced by scholars since the Treaty of Rome (1957) 
which contained the recognition of the right to equal pay for men and women 
[O’Connor: 2005: 346]. Further Europeanization of large sectors of economic 
policies in the next decades was not followed by similar process in the sphere of 
social policy which was exclusively the domain of national states. Therefore, the 
popular term ‘European Social Model’, which describes differentiated realms of 
various versions of welfare regime, was useful in the irst place as the opposi-
tion to the American or more strictly speaking US welfare policy, or to any other 
social policy settings all over the world. For many years every kind of harmoni-
zation of social rights within the EU was blocked, usually by representatives of 
the UK. Therefore, next crucial cornerstone in the development of the joint EU 
social strategy was the Amsterdam Treaty, approved 40 years after establishing 
the European Community. Thanks to the agreement of the Blair’s government, 
the Social Chapter has been added to the Treaty on European Union and for 
the irst time it has become one of the focal points of the EU discourse [Begg, 
Berghman 2002]. This strategic decision has been conirmed and reinforced three 
years later at the Lisbon Summit, which has assigned new strategic goals to the 
European Community, underlying this time the need for further coordination of 
the social policies in a frame of the EU. Lisbon assignments were followed by 
agreeing on Social Policy agenda which deined improvement of the quality of 
social policy, employment and industrial relations as crucial tasks, underlining 
meaning of social policy as a productive factor. The set of common social indi-
cators of social exclusion was agreed covering poverty, employment, health and 
education, which are supposed to be used by EU member states while reporting 
on the social situation. Similar processes have been initiated for employment and 
pensions. The enhanced role of the social policy in new EU social policy agenda 
should be achieved via Open Method of Coordination (OMC) which combines 
establishing particular goals to be achieved on the national level, setting up com-
mon indicators, and creating a monitoring system to track the process [O’Connor 
2005; de la Porte, Pochet 2001]. 
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This kind of benchmarking should lead to ‘institutionalized intelligent policy 
mimicking’, using the phrase of Frank Vandenbroucke [2002: XIX-XXIII], the Bel-
gian Minister of Social Affairs and Pensions who under the Belgian Presidency of the 
Council of the EU commissioned preparation of the report ‘A New European Welfare 
Architecture’. He pointed out three elements which are required to ensure well planned 
and eficient benchmarking: irst, reliable information on social policy and its results; 
second, evaluation of this information in the light of commonly deined objectives 
and third, contextualization of this data in relation to particular local conditions.  
One of the authors of this report was Gøsta Esping-Andersen, probably most 
prominent igure in the ield of social policy analysis in previous two decades, 
especially since publication his influential “The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism” in 1990. His typology of welfare states was hailed and criticized, 
contested and discussed. It was undoubtedly the most important reference point 
for the analysis of the European welfare in the recent decades. His classiication 
of the welfare states distinguished three ideal types of the welfare regimes: 
conservative, liberal and socio-democratic, which originated in different historical 
circumstances and followed different developmental trajectories. The typology 
is based in the irst place on the level of decommodiication in each of them and 
the kind of social stratiication and solidarities [Esping-andersen 1990: 27]. 
Esping-andersen’s classiication was modiied many times by various 
scholars, who usually extended number of ideal types using slightly different 
indicators and dimensions as the base for differentiation. Arts and Gelissen 
[2002: 141-144] point out the typologies of Castles and Mitchell (accordingly to 
the welfare expenditure, beneits equality and taxation), Ferrera (based on rules 
of eligibility and organizational, managerial and inancing regulations), Siaroff 
(with family orientation and gender issues taken into account), Bonoli (states 
differentiated by quantity of welfare expenditure), Korpi and Palme (related to 
the bases for entitlement and governance of social insurance programme) and 
the one of leibfried as the most notable and inluential ones2. While selecting 
2 Researchers try to avoid axiological assessment of the welfare states or setting up the hier-
archies. Quite rarely they present opinions which could be understood as supportive for one of the 
types. The example could be found in an article of Leibfried and Obinger [2001: 4] who admitted 
the eficacy of Scandinavian model of welfare, describing Finish experience of dramatic economic 
crisis at the beginning of the nineties. Nordic scheme proved at that time that system of social 
protection provided by the advanced, universalistic welfare state could help citizens to cope during 
even unexpected and overwhelming economic disaster. It turned out also that Scandinavian welfare 
model does not hamper the economic reforms with Finnish economic success without imposing 
drastic cutbacks in welfare expenditure being the best example.
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country cases for the purposes of the PROFIT project, the latter Leibfried’s 
typology has been implied. He has distinguished four types of welfare states: 
Anglo-Saxon (residual), Bismarck (institutional), Scandinavian (modern) and 
Latin Rim (rudimentary), accordingly to the social insurance and poverty policy 
in each of them. Four Western European countries being members of PROFIT 
sample represented these types of welfare states. 
It has to be underlined that none of the above mentioned typologies could be 
applied directly to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Although 
Deacon in 1992 had tried to categorize CEE states accordingly to the Esping-
Andersen’s typology, a half decade later he admitted that this attempt proved to 
be a failure as no empirical evidence supported his earlier claims [Deacon 1992, 
1997; quoted after: Cerami 2005: 44]. Cerami in his work on the emergence of 
welfare systems in CEE after the collapse of communisms provided evidence 
that in none of the states simple adoption of the pre-existing welfare regime 
took place. The appearance of certain solutions in a sphere of social policy 
was a combination of intersecting inluences of pre-existing institutional rules 
inherited from the communist era (and sometimes also from the institutional 
legacy from before communism), the choices and beliefs of the actors inluenced 
by the earlier discourse on the welfare issues and the interests of powerful 
pressure groups [Cerami 2006]. all these processes appeared in situation of rapid 
transformation of economic and political regimes and were also inluenced by 
the speciic historical and cultural tradition in each of the countries. as a result: 
different national settings have produced a variety of welfare structures, which 
esping-andersen and numerous other authors have tried to summarize and to 
categorize, neglecting, however, to develop a logical social policy framework 
[Cerami 2005: 45].
It also has to be remembered that in the course of transformation of economies 
of the CEE states, they all were exposed to serious economic pressure from the 
global institutions like International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which 
conditioned their inancial support for the CEE countries, encouraging the political 
circles to choose the path towards residual welfare policy of neo-liberal origins 
[deacon 2000: 146, 152]. 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen as the author of the already mentioned report on the 
new European welfare architecture underlined noticeable intensiication of the 
EU-wide debate over social affairs and the need of coordinating efforts undertaken 
at national level and the need of further Pan-European cooperation in this ields, 
especially after enlargement of the EU structures. The OMC seems for him to be 
the best path and at the same time, the only one that could be politically acceptable 
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for all member states. It is a solution that could pave the way for EU social policy 
to follow employment policy which is hailed by Esping-Andersen as example of 
success that could be repeated in the other areas of social policy via introduction 
of the OMC [Esping Andersen 2002: 13-15]. These decisions are important as 
the European states and society, no matter under which model of welfare, face 
or will face similar challenges. What Esping-Andersen as well as other authors 
underline is the impossibility of introduction of the European Social Model as 
the real, coherent political model that could be imposed on all member states. As 
O’Connor points it out [2005: 346]: (esM…) is an overarching aspirational model 
incorporating the broad parameters to which european welfare states conform. 
it is based on a broad conception of social policy encompassing a wide range of 
‘interventions for social purposes’. in the eu context the social dimension relates 
not to direct provision of services but is designed to prevent, mitigate or alleviate 
the social consequences of economic development within the eu. 
It is signiicant and surprising at the same time, that while interviewing policy 
makers in countries which participated in the PROFIT project, researchers were 
rarely faced with respondents’ views and considerations over such structural 
processes operating at the level of European Union. Obviously, this was not the 
most important subject of the interviews, but the European Community was quite 
rarely mentioned as the substantial one in reducing inequalities or counteracting 
inheritance of them between generations. Interviewed politicians rather tend to 
concentrate on the national level. Most of the respondents when asked directly 
about the EU impact on social policy tended to speak particularly about the process 
of the enlargement of the European Union and accession of the new member 
states. It refers especially to the politicians coming from new member states 
which entered the EU on the 1st of May, 2004 or candidate countries (when the 
ieldwork was carried out, Bulgaria was still on its road to the accession which 
took place on the 1st of January, 2007) who mentioned structural funds as the 
potential source of money which could be spend on social policy actions which 
could contribute to alleviating poverty, improving situation on the labour market 
or equalizing chances of children coming from families with low socio-economic 
status. Generally, impact of the EU accession was assessed very positively. Very 
few negative outcomes of the accession were mentioned with potential mass 
labour emigration which could cause a brain drain to the societies and economy 
as most frequent one [Pukelis et. al. 2006: 145; Warzywoda-Kruszyńska et. al. 
2006: 197]. Respondents from Western countries quite rarely spoke about the 
EU’s impact on inequalities in given countries. Their opinions were diversiied 
according to political orientation. For example, left-wing politicians in Italy 
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criticized the EU for imposing neo-liberal economic policy onto member states 
and others claimed that no serious impact of the EU over internal social affairs 
could be observed [longo, Sacchetto, Vianello 2006: 127]. 
At least partial answer to the question why policy-makers rarely perceive the 
issue of inheritance of inequalities, or more broadly the social policy affairs in 
relation to the supranational level of EU could be found in the concept of welfare 
culture, introduced by Pfau-Efinger [2005: 4-10] and deined as the relevant ideas 
in a given society surrounding the welfare state and the way it is embedded in 
society. Pfau-Efinger has enumerated three levels of welfare culture: values and 
models as a basis for policy; cultural values and beliefs in the population at large; 
and public and political discourses that mediate between the attitudes of the public 
and political decisions. According to her, ideas about the role of social policy 
vary substantially between countries. Meaning of such notions as solidarity or 
integration is conceptualized differently by representatives of different cultures. 
Beliefs about the personal responsibility for one’s own fate, substantial for the 
national social policy are also connected with tradition and historical background 
of given state. The commonly accepted values constitute cultural foundations of 
policies towards work, poverty, state-market relationships and to some extent 
determine the concrete solutions in policy-making process for example level of 
redistribution of state interventionist. 
It can be assumed that politicians, although representing different political 
orientations (especially those who operate just on the national level, not having 
connections to the debates in European parliament or without experience in supra-
national bodies), are immersed in discourse which is dominant in given country 
and legitimized by speciic values and norms, and as PROFIT research exampled, 
tend to concentrate on the state level while talking about social policy. 
ATTITuDES TOWARDS SOCIAL POLICY:THE MORE STuDIES, 
THE MORE DOUBTS 
It is already proved that populations differ in terms of their preferences 
about the welfare state, its role, in various areas of policy (e.g. employment, 
level of provision of services, taxation). Many studies have been conducted 
measuring attitudes and beliefs towards different aspects of social policy and 
welfare state, especially since large scale opinion surveys like International 
Social Survey Programme or European Social Survey were introduced. Their 
outcomes sometimes seemed to point in different directions, which is caused, as 
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Albrekt Larsen [2005: 2-3] argues, by dissimilar selection of dependent variables. 
However, generally they tend to prove that the more liberal welfare regime is 
in a given country, the lower support for redistribution and welfare policies in 
narrow ‘American’ meaning could be observed. 
Some of international studies were concentrated not only on comparisons of 
the support for redistribution among countries, but went into analysis of patterns of 
support for redistribution on the national levels, taking into account class position 
of the respondents. Though the attitudes towards redistribution were found to be 
clearly differentiated by the type of welfare regime, patterns of support among 
different social strata was very similar [Svallfors 1997: 283]. Other researchers 
concentrated on question how the level of inequalities differentiates public demand 
for redistribution. In some cases, application of different statistical methods 
provides them with completely opposite outcomes. Finseraas for example [2006] 
claims that his application of multi-level modelling to data from European Social 
Survey proved that high level of inequalities in a given country is positively 
linked with the demand for redistribution and, moreover, it moderates the negative 
effect of income on demand for redistribution and increase the probability of rich 
people’s support for the redistribution. It comes contrary to common beliefs and 
the results of the earlier studies, even those conducted with the same datasets 
[i.e. Jæger Meier 2005]. 
The quantitative studies over the level of legitimacy of certain welfare 
regimes are also criticized for its vagueness. Bonoli [2000: 432] criticized them 
for implementing too narrow deinition of welfare state legitimacy. accordingly 
to this author, not only questions concerning the role of the government and the 
role of social spending should be taken into account, but such analysis should 
encompass people’s attitudes towards broader range of topics e.g. labour code as 
one of the crucial factors deining rights and situation of citizens. 
All authors certainly defend their methodological rigours and selections of 
statistically advanced statistical tools, what could cause confusion among readers 
who would like to ind some conclusive answers for sometimes basic questions. 
The studies on the public perceptions and attitudes of issues linked to the 
social policy are numerous. However, empirical investigations of opinions of 
policy-makers, those who are responsible for the formulation and implementation 
of social policy are deinitely scarce. Studying political elite or any other kind of 
elites is considered as one of the most dificult challenges for social scientists. 
Study conducted in frame of the PROFIT project combine two elements of this 
kind of research. On one hand it refers to the way how members of the political 
elite perceive social process of inequality reproduction from one generation to 
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another. The substantial element of this perception is their perception of people 
coming from the complete opposite stratum of the social ladder: those who are 
subjected to the inheritance of low socio-economic status. De Swaan et al. [2000: 
43-44] designing studies on the elite perceptions of the poor applied the concept 
of social consciousness of the elites. Due to them: Members of the elites possess 
social consciousness to the degree that: 
1. they are aware of the interdependence among social groups in society 
– and, most relevantly, of the external effects of poverty upon elites, which may 
perceive either as threatening or as promising opportunities; 
2. they realize that as members of the elites they bear some responsibility for 
the condition of the poor; and
3. they believe that feasible and eficacious means of improving the lot of the 
poor exist or might be created. (…) 
The three elements of a ‘social consciousnesses refer to three different types 
of thinking by the elites. Points 1 entails a factual assessments of the condition 
of the society in which they live. it calls for a ‘proto-sociological’ insight on the 
part of elite members. Point 2 entails both factual assessments (the identiication 
of a causal chain linking their (in)action to the living conditions of the poor) and 
moral evaluations, which researchers need to sort out. Point 3 requires them to 
accept the power of collective or public agency (governmental or non-govern-
mental) to change about prevailing situation. 
This concept with a slight modiication moving the reference point from the 
poverty to the social inequalities could be applied to the inquiry about the political 
elites conducted in frame of the PROFIT project. This is not the substantial change 
in meaning, as from PROFIT empirical data it is evident that while speaking about 
social inequalities, most respondents tend to concentrate on people economically 
disadvantaged. However, in the short sketch of main indings presented in the 
latter part of this paper only some brief conclusions coming from the research 
are presented. The idea was to present general results in comparative perspective 
and not get into deep scrutiny over each of the national results, where concept 
of the social consciousness could be successfully implemented when taking into 
account speciic national and cultural circumstances. 
Thus, PROFIT research was concentrated in the irst place on the way how 
members of political bodies perceive the policy-making process and social policy 
itself as factor that could inluence the incidence of the inequality transmission 
from one generation to another. This is quite exceptional in comparative research 
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project, as even investigations over perceptions and attitudes of politicians towards 
welfare and its speciic features are rare. 
One of the unique examples of this kind of studies over opinions of political 
elites is the recent research by Bochel and Defty [2007] over British MPs’ attitudes 
to welfare state. This impressive investigation was built upon the former study 
of Taylor-Gooby and Bochel from the late 1980s which allowed comparisons of 
MPs attitudes under the Thatcher’s government with the ones of the members of 
parliament during Blair’s era. The research covered the whole British political 
scene with every tenth member of House of Commons being interviewed. It 
combined interview with open-ended questions concerning politicians’ views 
on the general role of the government in welfare policy with more structured 
questionnaire on speciic issues. This inquiry provided empirical proofs supporting 
claim of some political scientists of convergence of political attitudes on a middle 
ground between formerly antagonistic opponents. As Bochel and Defty pointed 
out [2007: 7-10] this process could be observed as the attitudes towards the role 
of the government and its impact on the welfare policy have changed signiicantly. 
Since utmost polarization in 1980s when conservative MPs believing that the 
state should just provide the citizens with the safety nets and Labour Party 
representatives supporting opinion that state should be a provider of the universal 
provisions of the highest standards, the bipolar division of the political scene has 
narrowed with both big UK’s parties moving to the centre. Twice less conservative 
MPs support currently the view of the state as the supplier of just basic safety nets 
and increased substantially number of the Labour Party members who spoke about 
‘new role of the welfare state’ which should concentrate on active and selective 
measures, in irst place in a ield of employment policy. 
EMPIRICAL DATA FROM THE PROFIT PROJECT
In the second part of this paper general conclusions coming from the PROFIT 
investigation over the policy-makers’ views on social policy and its interrelations 
with the intergenerational inheritance of inequalities are presented. For the pur-
poses of this short paper only general picture of the politicians’ opinions and the 
differentiation of their judgments is sketched with reference to their differentia-
tions among countries. In opinions of interviewees probably the most important 
factor that inluences life chances of the young generation in comparison with 
parents is level and quality of education. Therefore, it is educational policy that 
is mainly in their ield of interests. 
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For research purposes in the frame of the PROFIT project top level policy 
makers were deined as members of national parliament or those who occupy 
important positions in central governmental administrations (ministers, deputy 
ministers) and deal in every day practice with social policy affairs, being 
responsible for legislative works on the social policy formulation (for example 
as members of parliamentary committees on social affairs) This decision was 
based on the assumption that these politicians will possess broad knowledge on 
social policy and procedures which are connected with the legislative process. To 
reveal the ways of conceptualizing the problem in each country about ten semi-
structured interviews have been conducted with elected members of parliament 
and representatives of central administration. In all countries also some interviews 
with representatives of non-proit organizations were carried out, including trade 
unions and entrepreneurs’ organizations, who are engaged in implementation and 
sometimes also formulation of the social policy agenda.
National research teams were required to interview representatives of different 
parties and political orientations and they managed to reach them. It means that 
in each country almost the whole political scene existing at the moment of the 
study (December 2004 – February 2005) was covered. However, one ought to 
bear in mind the speciic selection of political actors. In consequence, the below 
presented results cannot be generalized as covering the judgments of the whole 
spectrum of top-level politicians in a given country. Though opinions of political 
actors dealing directly with social policy are important for policy formulating 
and implementing, they could not be considered deinitively decisive because the 
composition of the whole parliament as well as of the ruling coalitions can matter 
heavily. One of the respondents in Poland put it in this way: in the [parliamen-
tary] social policy committee we cooperate, we work together and some issues 
seem to be clear for all of us but when it comes to voting, party discipline forces 
left-wing parliamentarians to realize the program of the government (left-wing 
coalition was ruling at that time). 
another thing is that since the time of the ieldwork elections took place in 
some of the studied countries. It needs to be underlined, however, there are no 
serious premises to claim that conclusions drawn from the results of this research 
would vary substantially if the research were repeated after the elections. 
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TOP-LEVEL POLITICAL ACTORS’ uNDERSTANDING  
OF IIOFI AND THE PERCEPTION OF ITS ‘PRODuCERS’
The United Kingdom is unique among European countries in its war against 
child poverty, which can be translated as the war against poverty reproduction. 
although the mainstreaming of children has stepped up since October 2006 
throughout the EU, the transmission of poverty across generations has not been 
declared expressis verbis a priority in oficial government documents, like the 
National Strategy Reports (NSR), with the exception of the United Kingdom 
and Germany. This means that the intergenerational inheritance of inequalities 
is not perceived by national governments as a challenge to society that requires 
consolidated actions. The perceptions of IIofI by top level actors match this point 
of view. 
Though there are differences in opinions expressed by top politicians from 
particular countries, the following similarities should be underlined: [Warzywoda-
-Kruszyńska 2006:7] 
1. The intergenerational transmission of inequalities is mostly conceptualized 
as almost identical with passing on poverty (social exclusion) from one generation 
to another, whereas poverty is considered as multidimensional deprivation.
2. The problem is mostly considered to be ‘private’ transmission [Moore 2001] 
occurring between parents and their children. Transmission of different kinds of 
capital (cultural, social, economic) and/or of speciic patterns of behaviour and 
value system are underlined.
3. IIofI is perceived rather as a problem suffered by particular families than 
a severe social problem affecting society as a whole. 
FI: it does not concern so many people, but it is more like a stable and very 
complex problem. The big majority of children are doing well or at least moder-
ately well, but then there is a stable minority of those people who are either badly 
marginalized or socially excluded [Warzywoda-Kruszyńska 2006: 7]. 
4. Transmission of disadvantages across generations is treated more as a side-
effect of other processes like reduced demand for labour, globalization, and shocks 
like the system transformation in post-socialist countries, than as a separate social 
ill to be prioritized and approached in a speciic way.  
5. Except for Finland, the top-level actors perceive the causes of the persist-
ence of inequality and the possibilities for intervening in the process, according 
to their party manifesto, as ranging from relative reluctance (right wing parties) 
to requirement (left-wing parties) of state intervention in the process. 
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6. Reasons for the continuation of IIofI are considered complex and located 
at both individual and societal levels 
7. Most top politicians attach responsibility of preventing/counteracting the 
IIofI to public authorities. They underline the importance of cooperation between 
central and local government in the reduction of the risk of IIofI.
8. Of the utmost importance in the IIofI process education was underlined while 
labour market and welfare policies were considered secondary in the process. 
9. Via education people from poor or low status families may be upwardly 
mobile but the shortcomings in the education system functioning might ‘produce’ 
inequality transmission. 
SHORTCOMINGS OF EDUCATION POLICY IMPACTING  
ON THE PRODUCTION OF IIOFI 
Overall, the view held by most of the top level politicians in particular 
countries is that the educational system both limits and reinforces the cycle of 
inequality. It is only in Finland that educational policy was – almost without 
exception – considered successful among the political actors. Nevertheless, the 
interviewees recognised serious deiciencies in the education system as shown 
below. One of them said: as regards educational opportunities, i would say that 
we have reached equality. What we have not reached is equality in results, equality 
in – being clear – managing through the system [Naumanen 2006: 97]. 
Representatives of other Western countries were more critical but less speciic 
than the Finnish ones. They pointed out that educational policy constitutes the most 
serious problem in their countries without going any deeper into the details. For 
German politicians, it is the selectivity of the educational system that contributes 
to the persistence of inequality. For the British politicians the biggest perceived 
problem were the fees to pay for tertiary education limiting access to university 
for poor students. Among the Italians, the reinforcement of gender inequalities 
was seen as the greatest problem. 
Top politicians from post-socialist countries were much more speciic. The 
reason for this seems to be the almost total reconstruction of the educational sys-
tems during the transformation period in terms of structure of school systems and 
curricula. In some countries, a new educational system was implemented in the 
1990s whereas in others, like Bulgaria, the process is not yet inished. Tremen-
dous changes in the educational systems have provoked detailed consideration 
in these countries.
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according to top political actors there are deiciencies in educational policy 
contributing to the reinforcement of the cycle of inequality. They are the fol-
lowing:
1. Differences in the quality of teaching and equipment between schools 
resulting from:
a. Rural – urban differentiation, claimed in post socialist countries and 
in Finland. Poorly equipped rural schools offer a low quality of teaching and 
pupils do not have access to the equipment they need. Families living in rural 
areas usually cannot afford to buy all the teaching materials that are necessary 
for their children, including providing them with extra classes, fees, or support 
they need for further studies. 
b. Privatization of education: private schools and commercial programmes 
in public higher schools were mentioned in post-socialist countries. On the one 
hand, there are schools for children from the inancial elite. These schools charge 
high fees and provide high quality teaching, thus enabling graduates to study at 
foreign universities and maintain the social and economic status of their parents 
(as noticed in Bulgaria). On the other hand, private higher schools operating along 
commercial lines were established in post-socialist countries for those not able 
to meet the criteria to study free of charge at university. These students come 
most frequently from lower status families who were not able to provide children 
with extra-curricular courses to improve their chance of passing entrance exams. 
The quality of learning is low in private higher schools and thus the return on 
education is low, too. Therefore, it is an illusion to think that graduation from 
any higher school improves the opportunity to get a better job and be upwardly 
mobile in social and economic terms.
c. Formal differentiation among public schools: public elite schools in 
Estonia accept only pupils with the highest scores. There are schools for talented 
and gifted children that have excellent teaching staff and inancial resources. 
Competition for admission is strong and parents invest different kinds of capital 
(cultural, social, material) in children to increase their chances of admission. 
d. Informal public school segregation resulting from inancing schemes: in 
post-socialist countries, schools are inanced according to the number of pupils. 
Therefore they offer extras for payment, like additional language lessons, horse 
riding, etc., to attract children from upper income families living outside the 
school administrative district. Such pupils are gathered (in Poland) in separate 
classes for - as school teachers often claim – ‘organisational’ reasons.
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In the UK, educational funds are dispersed by the central government to Lo-
cal Education Authorities (LEAs). As Local Education Authorities also secure 
discretionary funds by competitive bidding, it becomes obvious that if an LEA 
is not properly equipped to co-ordinate and administers bids, the ‘trickle-down’ 
effects of this inadequacy directly affects the funds available to local schools.
e. The ethnic composition of pupils (Bulgaria, Estonia). Respondents admit 
that there is not suficient provision in schools for pupils from ethnic minorities.
2. Education is far too theoretical and does not match labour market 
demand. 
a. Withdrawal of vocational schools from the educational system was 
mentioned in almost all countries in the study. 
our educational system seems to be oriented towards preparing top-level 
scientists. However, most of the graduates will not become physicians, cell-tech-
nologists or historians (ee) [Trumm 2006: 55]. 
b. Depreciation of vocational education. Vocational education carries a la-
bel of ‘failure’ in post-socialist countries. This image has been partially inherited 
from the initial phase of the transition: the rapid restructuring of the economy led 
to a reduction in the demand for skilled agricultural or industrial workers, which 
almost exclusively were educated in vocational schools.  Consequently, the budget 
for vocational education was reduced, and schools fell into inancial dificulties. 
The lack of resources led to inability to react to the changing needs of the labour 
market and improved technologies, which cumulatively resulted in overwhelmingly 
negative attitudes concerning the entire vocational education system.
c. Skewed educational preferences. Very few are willing to enter vocational 
schools and acquire vocational training. Therefore, the labour market lacks people 
with such qualiications as: bricklayers, plumbers, carpenters, etc.
d. Prevalence of theoretical classes in vocational education. Even when 
vocational schools remain, like in Finland, they are claimed to be far too theoreti-
cal. Consequently, there are many people who could become very good workers 
in several practical professions, but who remain without qualiications because 
they cannot cope with the more theoretical subjects.
3. Curricula are not lexible and are overloaded, a problem mentioned in 
all post-socialist countries as well as in Finland and Italy:
a. The universal policy is not enough as regards the multidimensional and 
cumulative nature of inherited disadvantages. If there are not additional remedial 
or other selective measures to accommodate the most disadvantaged children, 
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they will continue to drop out of school because the school programme is too 
dificult for them, as noticed in Finland and Estonia.
b. In schools, pupils do not learn what they need:
The main problem “is not to learn how to do things, it is to learn how to 
learn” (IT) [longo, Sachetto, Vianello 2006: 132]. 
c. School curricula are overloaded with huge amounts of information 
and are ineffective in providing knowledge and training skills necessary for the 
future lives of students.
4. Education is underinvested and schools lack resources to make any 
improvements (especially in post-socialist countries) or offer compensatory 
programmes: 
 in practice, the money that are currently directed towards the educational 
system are used mainly for paying teachers’ salaries, and there are no funds 
for the modernisation of schools, for computers and for upgrading the level of 
education (BG) [Ignatova 2006a: 27-28]. 
a. Construction and maintenance of school buildings is included in the 
expenditures for education. Such practice makes educational expenditure less 
transparent and produces the impression that education is generously inanced.
b. Policy decisions made elsewhere undermine any supportive structures. 
These policy solutions include not only the cuts in educational expenditure, 
closing down schools and making classes larger, but the tightening of timetables 
and demands in the school curriculum. There are not enough possibilities for 
individual teaching and learning. 
5. There are intra-school mechanisms pushing children from disadvan-
taged families out of school, noticed mainly by Estonian respondents:
a. Labelling and stigmatization 
by teachers:
it seems to me, that the school rather legitimises inequality, instead of reducing 
it. real stigmatisation happens here – children are stigmatised because of their 
families and they are treated according to that stigma. sometimes teachers even 
look differently at the ‘stigmatised’ children. The teacher, who allows him/her not 
to notice the efforts of the child who tries to achieve the same results as his / her 
schoolmates from better conditions, is a psychological criminal. unfortunately, 
there are many such criminals (EE) [Trumm 2006: 59].
Particularly in the smaller rural schools, the family background of children 
(unemployment, family conlicts, drug abuse, etc.) is sometimes ascribed to the 
child by the teachers.
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by schoolmates:
of course, children are not blind. They always notice if somebody wears 
second-hand clothes; they know who has a cellular phone and who does not; 
they know when somebody has no pocket money, etc. They know all of this, and 
they speak it out. Nevertheless, they do not think about why it is so (EE) [Trumm 
2006: 60].
It results in the exclusion of poor children from better-off peers and con-
strains them to belong to a group of peers who have the same living standards 
and attitudes.
b. Withdrawal of socialization functions from the school. Schools try to 
get rid of students with problems. Schools are selecting pupils according to their 
behaviour and performance. 
Though above-mentioned deiciencies were underlined mainly by politicians 
from post-socialist countries, they seem to affect all countries in the study to some 
extent. Prevalence of general education and withdrawal of vocational schools 
makes it dificult for less talented pupils and for pupils who do not have the sup-
port from their families to get the qualiications and be materially independent 
as an adult. Underdevelopment of education for adults, claimed by many politi-
cians, makes the situation worse. Those who dropped out of school have little 
possibility to get a second chance.
INTERRELATIONS OF CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOvERNMENT  
IN THE OvERCOMING OF IIOFI, AS PERCEIvED  
BY TOP-LEVEL ACTORS
apart from structural reasons attached to the school system, some deicien-
cies in school functioning are embedded in the division of responsibility between 
central and local government. In all countries, provision of social services in-
cluding school education and welfare is attached to local government, which is 
overloaded with tasks and underinanced. Nevertheless, communities attempt to 
do their best to support people, particularly children in need.
Division of power and responsibilities between central and local levels of 
government is different in different countries taking part in the Proit project. 
Finland and the United Kingdom (or – to be more precise – England, where 
Loughborough is situated, the only region within the UK that has not increased 
its autonomy vis-à-vis the central authorities in London during the recent wave of 
devolution, i.e. series of institutional reforms of the British governance system) 
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are centralized countries, also when it comes to the policy responses aimed at 
counteracting the intergenerational inheritance of inequalities. In Finland activities 
counteracting inequalities, even though they are locally implemented, are mainly 
designed and promoted by central government authorities. The ways of organising 
and inancing activities may vary according to the needs of local communities, but 
the main ideas and principles of operation are formulated at the national level.
Alternatively, Italy and Germany represent countries with the largest margin 
of autonomy at the local and – irst and foremost – regional level. Germany is 
a federal country where only selected policies (e.g. labour market policy) are 
formulated and implemented at the national level. Educational policy lies in 
regional governments’ (Länder) hands, while local communities are responsible 
for delivering welfare to their inhabitants. In Italy, although formally it is not 
a federal country, regional governments possess considerable autonomy, too. 
Since constitutional amendments were passed in 2001, the regions are exclusively 
responsible for welfare policies. Thus, it is the regional level of governance that 
has become crucial in designing policy measures aimed at overcoming the inter-
generational inheritance of inequalities.
Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland are countries with a uniform model 
of administration, in which, however, local authorities play an increasingly im-
portant role. The range of autonomy (and responsibility) of the local authorities 
has gradually expanded in these countries during the previous and the current 
decade. Poland has the most complicated division of responsibilities between 
three levels of self-government and between central and local government.  
Though the division of power and responsibilities between central and local 
levels of government is different in countries in the study, there is a commonly 
shared opinion among top-level actors that:     
1. The interrelationship and cooperation between central and local government 
is necessary in the ight against poverty and the reproduction of inequality 
2. Decentralization of responsibility for solving social problems is useful 
because only communities are able to:
a) deine social needs according to local circumstances
b) deine accurately groups and individuals requiring support
c) provide social services tailored to speciic needs
d) implement a holistic approach
e) act eficiently in spending public funds
f) create networking respective to needs
g) attract private institutions and organizations to cooperate. 
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3. Cooperation between central and local levels of governance in overcoming 
poverty and its reproduction is a matter of criticism.
4. The imprecise and inappropriate division of responsibilities between central 
regional/local governments makes it often dificult to satisfy needs.
5. Overloading and under inancing of communities makes them less eficient 
than they could be. 
6. Coordination of social services in communities is perceived as weak and 
insuficient.  
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Wojciech Woźniak
TOP lEVEl aCTORS SPEaK aBOUT SOCIal POlICy  
AND INTERGENERATIONAL INHERITANCE OF INEQUALITIES 
 (Summary)
The article has been divided into two parts. In the irst one the author presents dominant 
trends of the contemporary academic discourse over the European social policy, in the context of 
progressive europeization in this ield as well and on the level of comparative research. The second 
part of the article depicts results of studies led among central level politicians (members of parlia-
ment, members of government) conducted by each national research team within the framework 
of the PROFIT project. The starting point of the research was the assumption that the way politi-
cians contextualize the problem of social inequalities inheritance and politicians’ opinions about 
the phenomenon of IIofI can considerably inluence the mode state’s priorities concerning social 
policy are being formulated. 
POlITyKa SPOŁECzNa I NIERÓWNOŚCI SPOŁECzNE  
W PERCEPCJI POlITyKÓW SzCzEBla CENTRalNEGO
(Streszczenie)
artykuł podzielony jest na dwie części. W pierwszej autor prezentuje główne nurty rozważań 
obecne we współczesnej akademickiej releksji na temat europejskiej polityki społecznej, zarówno 
w kontekście postępującej europeizacji tej dziedziny, jak również na poziomie badań kompara-
tywnych. W drugiej części przedstawione są w sposób porównawczy oraz syntetyczny wyniki 
badań przeprowadzonych przez zespoły krajowe realizujące projekt PROFIT wśród polityków 
szczebla centralnego (parlamentarzystów, członków rządów) zajmujących się zagadnieniami 
polityki społecznej w każdym z ośmiu krajów uczestniczących w badaniach. U podstaw przeprow-
adzonych badań leżała konstatacja, iż sposób konceptualizacji problemu dziedziczenia nierówności 
społecznych przez polityków oraz ich opinie na temat tego zjawiska mogą mieć znaczący wpływ na 
sposób formułowania priorytetów państwa w zakresie realizowanej przezeń polityki społecznej. 
